

Chapter 2

THE NATURE OF THE BEAST: DEFINING TERRORISM

This chapter investigates definitional issues in the study of terrorism. Students will probe the nuances of these issues and will learn that the truism “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter” is a significant factor in the definitional discussion. It must be remembered that this debate occurs within a practical and “real-life” framework—the nontheoretical reality that some political, religious, or ethnonationalist beliefs and behaviors are so reprehensible that they cannot be considered to be mere differences in opinion. Some violent incidents are *malum in se* acts of terrorist violence. For example, the New Terrorism is characterized by the threat of weapons of mass destruction, indiscriminate targeting, and potentially high casualty rates—as was the case in the attacks of September 11, 2001. The use of these weapons and tactics against civilians is indefensible, no matter what cause is championed by those who use them.

This debate is evident in both state-sponsored and dissident terrorist environments:

State-Sponsored Terrorist Environments. As noted in Chapter 1, the *régime de la terreur* during the French Revolution was an instrument of revolutionary justice, so that terrorism was considered a positive medium used by the defenders of order and liberty. From their perspective, state-sponsored domestic terrorism was both acceptable and necessary to consolidate power and protect liberties won during the Revolution. Modern examples of state terrorism such as Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia also sought to consolidate an ideological vision through internal political violence—a racial new order in Germany and an egalitarian worker’s state in the Soviet Union. The methods they used to build the ideological vision resulted in the deaths of millions of noncombatant civilians, and both the Nazi and Stalinist regimes are now considered to be terrorist states. State terrorism is explored further in Chapter 4.

Dissident Terrorist Environments. The definitional debate is also evident in dissident terrorist environments. The anticolonial and nationalist wars after the Second World War often pitted indigenous rebels against European colonial powers or ruling local elites. Many of these wars involved the use of terrorism as an instrument of war by both state and dissident forces. During these wars, as well as in subsequent domestic rebellions, the rebels were referred to as freedom fighters by those who favored their cause.¹ The counterpoints to these freedom fighters were the European (and American) “colonial oppressors.” Thus, for example, indiscriminate attacks against civilians by rebels in French

Indochina and French Algeria were rationalized by many of their supporters as acceptable tactics during wars of liberation by freedom fighters against a colonial oppressor.

The discussion in this chapter will review:

- Reactionaries and Radicals: Revisiting the Classical Ideological Continuum
- Understanding Extremism—The Foundation of Terrorism
- Defining Terrorism
- A Definitional Problem: Perspectives on Terrorism
- The Political Violence Matrix

REACTIONARIES AND RADICALS: REVISITING THE CLASSICAL IDEOLOGICAL CONTINUUM

The classical ideological continuum summarizes the conventional political environment of the modern era. First introduced in Chapter 1, it is a useful tool for understanding:

- The beliefs and behaviors of violent movements, authoritarian states, and terrorist groups
- The ideological justifications for terrorist violence

It is not difficult to draw a conceptual distinction between right-wing and left-wing ideologies. To begin, one must be aware that the term *reactionary* has been affixed to far- and fringe-rightist ideologies, and *radical* has been affixed to far- and fringe-leftist ideologies. These terms are, of course, exercises in semantics. As such, they can be at best imprecise and, at worst, confusing. Rather than enter into an academic debate about the meaning of these terms, it is instructive for students to understand the following two concepts:

Right-wing extremism is generally a reaction against a perceived threat to a group's value system, its presumption of superiority, or its sense of specialness. Rightists often try to preserve their value system and special status by aggressively asserting this status. They frequently desire to return to a time of past glory, which in their belief system has been lost or usurped by an enemy group or culture. In this sense, rightist extremism is *nostalgic*.

Left-wing extremism is future oriented, seeking to reform or destroy an existing system prior to building a new and just society. To the extent that leftists champion a special group, it is usually one that is perceived to be oppressed unjustly by a corrupt system or government. This group is commonly a class or ethno-national category that, in their belief system, must receive the justice and equality that has been denied them. In doing so, leftists believe that reform of the system, or revolution, is needed to build a just society. In this sense, leftist extremism is *idealistic*.

In the modern era, many nationalist or religious terrorists do not fit easily into the classical continuum. For example,

To argue that the Algerian terrorists, the Palestinian groups, or the Tamil Tigers are “left” or “right” means affixing a label that simply does not fit. . . . The Third World groups . . . have subscribed to different ideological tenets at different periods.²

A case in point is the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) guerrilla movement in Angola during the 1970s and thereafter. UNITA was nominally leftist when it fought alongside the Marxist Movement for the Liberation of Angola

24 TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

(MPLA) against the Portuguese colonialists, but it became strongly anti-Communist when it was supported by the United States and South Africa in its civil war against the MPLA after the Portuguese withdrawal.

Nevertheless, the classical continuum is still very useful for categorizing terrorist behaviors and extremist beliefs. Table 2.1 compares the championed groups, methodologies, and desired outcomes of typical political environments on the continuum.

An Ideological Analysis: From the Left Fringe to the Right Fringe

Fringe left ideology is usually an extreme interpretation of Marxist ideology, using theories of class warfare or ethno-national liberation to justify political violence. At the leftist fringe, violence is seen as a perfectly legitimate option, because the fringe group considers itself to be at war with an oppressive system, class, or government. The key justification is that the fringe group pictures itself as a righteous champion of the poor and downtrodden.

This type of ideological movement frequently concerns itself only with destroying an existing order in the name of the championed class or national group, not with building the new society in the aftermath of the revolution. For example, **Gudrun Ensslin**, a leader of the terrorist Red Army Faction in West Germany, stated: "As for the state of the future, the time after victory, that is not our concern. . . . We build the revolution, not the socialist model."³ Leftist terrorism will be discussed further in Chapter 6.

Far left ideology frequently applies Marxist theory to promote class or ethno-national rights. It is best characterized as a radical worldview, because political declarations often direct public attention against perceived forces of exploitation or repression. Far left groups do not necessarily engage in political violence and often fully participate in democratic processes. In Western Europe, for example, Communist parties and their affiliated Communist labor unions have overtly agitated for reform through democratic processes.⁴ The French Communist Party has regularly had its members elected at the national level,⁵ as has the Italian Communist Party.⁶ In March 1977, the Spanish, Italian, and French Communist Parties embarked on an independent, yet undefined, course setting them apart from the orthodox Moscow-inspired path. The new path was called EuroCommunism.⁷

It is important to note that this environment of relatively peaceful coexistence occurs only in societies where dissent is tolerated. In countries with weaker democratic traditions, far left dissent has erupted in violence and been met by extreme repression. Latin America has many examples of this kind of environment, some of which are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

Liberalism is a term that has been defined differently depending on the historical or national contexts in which it has been used. In its original context, European liberalism arose as a philosophical challenge to the absolutism practiced by monarchies. It advocated the rights of the individual vis-à-vis the monarch and the state. Liberty in political expression and equality under the law were the ideals of liberalism, although as practiced, these ideals were not enjoyed by every person in society. For example, the French and American revolutions embodied liberal principles, but the French state fell into civil war and Napoleonic imperialism, and American constitutional rights were not afforded to women or African Americans until the 20th century. Thus, 19th-century liberalism was highly contextualized and even conservative by modern standards.

In the modern era, and particularly in the American context, liberalism "expects to use government in a positive and expansive role . . . motivated by the highest sentiments," and "it sees as both necessary and good that the policy agenda and the public interest be defined in terms of the organized interests in society."⁸ From this perspective, the various

Table 2.1 The Classical Ideological Continuum: Modern Political Environments

Activism on the left, right, and center can be distinguished by a number of characteristics. A comparison of these attributes is instructive. The representation here compares their championed groups, methodologies, and desired outcomes.

	<i>Left Fringe</i>	<i>Far Left</i>	<i>Liberalism</i>	<i>Moderate Center</i>	<i>Conservatism</i>	<i>Far Right</i>	<i>Fringe Right</i>
<i>Championed groups</i>	Class/ nationality	Class/ nationality	Selected groups in society	General society	General society	Race, ethnicity, nationality, religion	Race, ethnicity, nationality, religion
<i>Methodology/process</i>	Liberation movement	Political agitation	Partisan democratic processes	Consensus	Partisan democratic processes	Political agitation	“Order” movement
<i>Desired outcome</i>	Radical change	Radical change	Incremental reform	Status quo slow change	Traditional values	Reactionary change	Reactionary change

26 TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

people's rights movements—such as the human, civil, women's, and gay rights movements—are usually considered to be liberal in nature.

The **moderate center** is best described as the stable balancing segment of the political environment. Political expression is conducted within accepted traditional institutions and rarely exhibits sustained group-centered activism or agitation. In a democracy, the moderate center is ideally the largest segment in the political environment, drawing support from both liberal and conservative ranks that need its political support. Consensus, not adversarial confrontation, is the hallmark of the moderate center.

Conservatism, like liberalism, is a concept that evolved over time and within the context of political and social conflict. The French Revolution and subsequent upheavals in Europe caused a backlash that sought to reestablish order and the rule of law. Edmund Burke, who criticized the excesses of the French Revolution, is considered to be the father of modern conservatism. Conservatives of the 19th century argued that, rather than rejecting the past in favor of an idealized vision of how humans *ought* to live, one should preserve (conserve) the good features of the existing order. Conservatives held that change, especially radical change, ought to be questioned. In the modern era, and particularly in the American context, "conservatism is committed to a discriminating defense of social order against change and reform."⁹ It questions government intervention in the private sector, especially regulation of the market. In essence, conservatism wishes to preserve traditional values and beliefs.

Far right ideology is characterized by strong adherence to social order and traditional values. There is sometimes a religious or mystical dimension to the worldview of the far right—especially in the United States—as well as an undercurrent of racial or ethnic chauvinism. As with the case of the far left, far right groups do not necessarily engage in political violence and have fully participated in democratic processes. Organized political expression is often overt. For example, rightist political parties in many European countries are a common feature of national politics. Their success has been mixed. In Spain, Greece, and Great Britain, these parties have little popular support.¹⁰ However, the far right parties in Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy have enjoyed significant popular support in the recent past.

Not all far right political movements are the same. A comparison of the American and European contexts is instructive. In Europe, some of these parties are nostalgic neofascist parties, such as the German People's Union. Others are more populist, such as the National Front in France.¹¹ They all tend to favor an open market, "articulate a low-tax, anti-welfare-state ideology . . . may support 'law and order' and a vigorous military . . . [and] condemn bureaucracy [and] excessive state control."¹² In the United States, the far right is characterized by activism among local grassroots organizations and has no viable political party. Some American groups have a religious orientation, others are racial, and others embody a politically paranoid survivalist lifestyle. The American far right will be discussed further in Chapter 12.

Fringe right ideology is usually rooted in an uncompromising belief in ethno-national or religious superiority, and terrorist violence is justified as a protection of the purity of the group. Terrorists on the fringe right picture themselves as champions of an ideal order that has been usurped, or attacked, by inferior interests or unwanted religious values. Violence is an acceptable option against those who are not members of the group or religion, because they are considered to be obstacles to the natural assumption of power by the favored group or belief. Like terrorists on the fringe left, right-wing terrorists often have only a vague notion of the characteristics of the new order after the revolution. They are concerned only with asserting their value system and, if necessary, destroying the existing order. Significantly, rightist terrorists have been more likely to engage in indiscriminate bombings and other attacks that produce higher numbers of victims. Right-wing terrorism will be discussed further in Chapter 7.

Table 2.2 applies this discussion to the American context.

Table 2.2 The Classical Ideological Continuum: The Case of the United States

<i>Left Fringe</i>	<i>Far Left</i>	<i>Liberalism</i>	<i>Moderate Center</i>	<i>Conservatism</i>	<i>Far Right</i>	<i>Fringe Right</i>
<i>Economic/class agenda</i>						
United Freedom Front	Communist Party, USA	American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations	Teamsters Union	Lyndon Larouche groups	Posse Comitatus
<i>Activist/group rights agenda</i>						
Black Liberation Army	Black Panther Party	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People	National Bar Association	Heritage Foundation	National Association for the Advancement of White People	Aryan Republican Army
<i>Religious/faith agenda</i>						
Liberation theology	Catholic Worker movement	American Friends Service Committee	National Conference of Christians and Jews	Southern Baptist Convention	Moral Majority	Army of God
<i>Legal/constitutional agenda</i>						
Individual lawyers	National Lawyers Guild	American Civil Liberties Union	American Bar Association	Thomas More Law Center	American Center for Law and Justice	Freemen

28 TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

The “New Terrorism”

Referring to the classical ideological continuum is useful for developing a good understanding of modern terrorist behavior. It is also important to understand, however, that the growing threat of the New Terrorism adds a unique dimension to the emerging terrorist environment of the 21st century. This is because “the new terrorism is different in character, aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population.”¹³

The new breed of terrorists “would feel no compunction over killing hundreds of thousands if they had the means to do so.”¹⁴ In addition, the emerging terrorist environment is characterized by a “horizontal” organizational arrangement wherein independent cells operate autonomously without reporting to a hierarchical (“vertical”) command structure. Many of these new terrorists are motivated by religious or nationalist precepts that may not fit easily into the classical continuum. The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States are an example of this emerging environment.

**UNDERSTANDING EXTREMISM:
THE FOUNDATION OF TERRORISM**

An important step toward defining terrorism is to develop an understanding of the *sources* of terrorism. In order to identify these sources, one must first understand the important role of **extremism** as a primary feature underlying all terrorist behavior.

Behind each incident of terrorist violence is some type of deeply held *belief system* that has motivated the perpetrators. These belief systems are, at their core, extremist systems characterized by intolerance. One must keep in mind, however, that although terrorism is a violent expression of these beliefs, it is by no means the *only* possible manifestation of extremism. On a scale of activist behavior, extremists can engage in such benign expressions of their beliefs as sponsoring debates or publishing newspapers. Or they might engage in vandalism and other disruptions of the normal routines of their enemies. Our focus in this chapter and subsequent chapters will be on violent extremist behavior that many people would define as acts of terrorism. But first, we must briefly investigate the general characteristics of the extremist foundations of terrorism.

Defining Extremism

Recall from Chapter 1 that extremism is broadly defined as “radical in opinion, especially in political matters; ultra; advanced.”¹⁵ More specifically, *political* extremism refers to

taking a political idea to its limits, regardless of unfortunate repercussions, impracticalities, arguments, and feelings to the contrary, and with the intention not only to confront, but to eliminate opposition. . . . Intolerance toward all views other than one’s own.¹⁶

Extremism is a precursor to terrorism—it is an overarching belief system that is used by terrorists to justify their violent behavior. Extremism is characterized by *what* a person’s beliefs are as well as *how* a person expresses his or her beliefs. Thus, no matter how offensive or reprehensible one’s thoughts or words are, they are not by themselves acts of terrorism. Only persons who *violently* act out their extremist beliefs are labeled as terrorists.

Two examples illustrate this point:

First, an example of extremist behavior. **Daniel and Philip Berrigan** were well-known members of the Roman Catholic pacifist left and were leaders in the antiwar and antinuclear

movements in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. *What* they believed in was an uncompromising commitment to pacifism. *How* they expressed their beliefs was by committing a series of symbolic, and often illegal, protest actions. During one such action on May 17, 1968, they and seven other Catholic men and women entered the Baltimore Selective Service Board, stole Selective Service classification forms, took them outside to a parking lot, and burned several hundred of the documents with a homemade napalm-like gelled mixture of gasoline and soap flakes. This was certainly extremist behavior, but it falls short of terrorism.¹⁷

Second, an example of extremist speech. The **American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan** (AK-KKK) were an activist faction of the KKK that operated mostly in the Midwest and East during the 1990s. *What* they believed in was racial supremacy. *How* they expressed their beliefs was by holding a series of rallies at government sites, often county courthouses. They were known for their vitriolic rhetoric. The following remarks were reportedly taken from a speech delivered by the Imperial Wizard of the AK-KKK in March 1998 at a rally held at the county courthouse in Butler, Pennsylvania, near Pittsburgh:

Take a stand. . . . Join the Klan, stick up for your rights. . . . Only God has the right to create a race—not no black and white, not no nigger, not no Jew. . . . Yes, I will use the word *nigger*, because it is not illegal. . . . We are sick and tired of the government taking your money, and giving food and jobs to the niggers when the white race has to go without! Wake up America.¹⁸

This language is intentionally racist, hateful, and inflammatory, and yet it falls short of advocating violence or revolution. A sympathetic listener might certainly act out against one of the enemy groups identified in the speech, but it reads more like a racist diatribe than a revolutionary manifesto.

Common Characteristics of Violent Extremists

Scholars and other experts have identified common characteristics exhibited by violent extremists. These characteristics are expressed in different ways, depending on a movement's particular belief system. The following commonalities are summaries of traits identified by these experts and are by no means an exhaustive inventory.¹⁹

Intolerance. Intolerance is the hallmark of extremist belief systems and terrorist behavior. The cause is considered to be absolutely just and good, and those who disagree with the cause (or some aspect of the cause) are cast into the category of the opposition. Terrorists affix their opponents with certain negative or derisive labels to set them apart from the extremists' movement. These characterizations are often highly personalized, so that specific individuals are identified who symbolize the opposing belief system or cause. Thus, during the Cold War, the American president was labeled by the pro-United States camp as the "leader of the free world" and by Latin American Marxists as the embodiment of "Yankee imperialism."²⁰

Moral Absolutes. Moral absolutes are adopted by terrorists, so that the distinction between good and evil is very clearly drawn, as are the lines between the terrorists and their opponents. The terrorists' belief or cause is a morally correct vision of the world and is used to establish moral superiority over others. Violent extremists thus become morally and ethically pure elites who lead the oppressed masses to freedom. For example, religious terrorists often believe that their "one true faith" is superior to all others and that any behavior committed in defense of the faith is perfectly justifiable.

30 TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

Broad Conclusions. Extremist conclusions are made to simplify the goals of the cause and the nature of the extremist's opponents. These generalizations are not debatable and allow for no exceptions. Evidence for these conclusions is rooted in one's belief system rather than based on objective data. Terrorists often believe these generalizations because in their minds they simply *must* be true. For example, ethno-nationalists frequently categorize all members of their opponent group as having certain broadly negative traits.

New Language and Conspiratorial Beliefs. Language and conspiracies are created to demonize the enemy and set the terrorists apart from those who are not part of their belief system. Extremists thus become a special elite who have discovered a hidden agenda and who have become targets of that agenda. For example, some American far right conspiracy proponents express their anti-Semitic beliefs by using coded references to "international bankers" or the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG). Neo-Nazi rightists degrade members of non-European races by referring to them as "mud people."

The World of the Extremist

Extremists have a very different—and at times, fantastic—worldview compared to nonextremists. They set themselves apart as protectors of some truth or as the true heirs of some legacy. For example, racial extremists within the American Patriot movement have argued that minorities are "Fourteenth Amendment citizens" and that only

whites are sovereign citizens whose rights are delineated, not by the government, but rather by a cobbled assortment of historical writings whose meaning is often subject to their fanciful interpretation.²¹

Likewise, extremists frequently believe that secret and quasi-mystical forces are arrayed against them and that these forces are the cause of worldwide calamities. For example, some bigoted conspiracy believers argue that the Illuminati or international Judaism mysteriously control world banking or run the governments of France or the United States. One conspiracy theory that was widely believed among Islamic extremists in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks was that Israeli agents were behind the attacks; that 4,000 Jews received telephone calls to evacuate the World Trade Center in New York; and thus, that no Jews were among the victims of the attack.

When terrorists adopt a religious belief system, their worldview becomes one of a struggle between supernatural forces of good and evil. They view themselves as living a righteous life in a manner that fits with their interpretation of God's will. According to religious extremists, those who do not conform to their belief system are opposed to the one true faith. Those who live according to the accepted belief system are a chosen people, and those who do not are not chosen. These interpretations of how one should behave include elements of the social or political environment that underlies the belief system. For example, Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina, is a fundamentalist Christian university founded in 1927. It once justified its prohibition against interracial dating and marriage as an application of truths found in holy scripture. Similarly, one student at a Pakistani religious school stated,

Osama [bin Laden] wants to keep Islam pure from the pollution of the infidels. . . . He believes Islam is the way for all the world. He wants to bring Islam to all the world.²²

Extremists have a very clear sense of mission, purpose, and righteousness. They create a worldview that sets them apart from the rest of society. Thus, extremist beliefs and terrorist behaviors are very logical from the perspective of those who accept the extremists' belief system, but illogical from the point of view of those who reject the system.

DEFINING TERRORISM

There is some consensus among experts—but no unanimity—on what kind of violence constitutes an act of terrorism. Governments have developed definitions of terrorism, individual agencies within governments have adopted definitions, private agencies have designed their own definitions, and academic experts have proposed and analyzed dozens of definitional constructs. This lack of unanimity, which exists throughout the public and private sectors, is an accepted reality in the study of political violence.

A significant amount of intellectual energy has been devoted to identifying formal elements of terrorism, as illustrated by Alex Smid's surveys, which identified more than 100 definitions.²³ Establishing formal definitions can, of course, be complicated by the perspectives of the participants in a terrorist incident, who instinctively differentiate freedom fighters from terrorists, regardless of formal definitions. Another complication is that most definitions focus on political violence perpetrated by dissident groups, even though many governments have practiced terrorism as both domestic and foreign policy.

Guerrilla Warfare. One important observation must be kept in mind and understood at the outset: *Terrorism is not synonymous with guerrilla warfare.* The term *guerrilla* ("little war") was developed during the early 19th century when Napoleon's army fought a long, brutal, and ultimately unsuccessful war in Spain. Unlike the Napoleonic campaigns elsewhere in Europe, which involved conventional armies fighting set-piece battles, the war in Spain was a classic unconventional conflict. The Spanish *people*, as opposed to the Spanish *army*, rose in rebellion and resisted the invading French. They liberated large areas of the Spanish countryside. After years of costly fighting—in which atrocities were common on both sides—the French were driven out. Thus, in contrast to terrorists, the term *guerrilla fighters* refers to

a numerically larger group of armed individuals, who operate as a military unit, attack enemy military forces, and seize and hold territory (even if only ephemerally during the daylight hours), while also exercising some form of sovereignty or control over a defined geographical area and its population.²⁴

Dozens, if not scores, of examples of guerrilla warfare exist in the modern era. They exhibit the classic strategy of hit-and-run warfare. Many examples also exist of successful guerrilla campaigns against numerically and technologically superior adversaries.

Thus, the effort to formally define terrorism is a critical one, because government antiterrorist policy calculations must be based on criteria that determine whether or not a violent incident is an act of terrorism. Governments and policymakers must piece together the elements of terrorist behavior and demarcate the factors that distinguish terrorism from other forms of conflict.

A Sampling of Formal Definitions

In Europe, countries that endured terrorist campaigns have written official definitions of terrorism. The British have defined terrorism as "the use or threat, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, of action which involves serious violence against any person or property."²⁵ In Germany, terrorism has been described as an "enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes."²⁶ And the European Interior Ministers note that "terrorism is . . . the use, or the

32 TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

threatened use, by a cohesive group of persons of violence (short of warfare) to effect political aims.”²⁷

Scholars have also tried their hand at defining terrorism. For example, terrorism has been described by Gurr as “the use of unexpected violence to intimidate or coerce people in the pursuit of political or social objectives.”²⁸ It was described by Gibbs as “illegal violence or threatened violence against human or nonhuman objects,” so long as that violence meets additional criteria such as secretive features and unconventional warfare.²⁹ Bruce Hoffman wrote:

We come to appreciate that terrorism is ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent—or, equally important, threatens violence; designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia); and perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.

We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of change.³⁰

To further illustrate the range of definitions, Whittaker lists the following descriptions of terrorism by terrorism experts: ³¹

Contributes the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted (Walter Laqueur).

A strategy of violence designed to promote desired outcomes by instilling fear in the public at large (Walter Reich).

The use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change (Brian Jenkins).

From this discussion, we can identify the common features of most formal definitions. These include:

- The use of illegal force
- Subnational actors
- Unconventional methods
- Political motives
- Attacks against “soft” civilian and passive military targets
- Acts aimed at purposefully affecting an audience

The emphasis, then, is on the adoption by terrorists of specific types of motives, methods, and targets. One fact that is readily apparent from these formal definitions is that they are very focused on terrorist *groups* rather than terrorist *states*. As will be made abundantly clear in Chapter 4, state terrorism has been responsible for many more deaths and much more suffering than terrorism originating from small groups of terrorists.

THE AMERICAN CONTEXT: DEFINING TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES

The United States has not adopted a single definition of terrorism as a matter of government policy, instead relying on definitions that are developed from time to time by government agencies. These definitions reflect the United States’ traditional law enforcement approach to distinguishing terrorism from more common criminal behavior.

The following definitions are a sample of the official U.S. approach toward defining terrorist behavior:

The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of, or threatened use, of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.”³² The U.S. Code defines terrorism as illegal violence that attempts to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population; . . . influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or . . . affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.”³³ The Federal Bureau of Investigation has defined terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”³⁴ By the State Department, terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”³⁵

Using these definitions, the following common elements can be used to construct a composite American definitional model:

Terrorism is a premeditated and unlawful act in which groups or agents of some principal engage in a threatened or actual use of force or violence against human or property targets. These groups or agents engage in this behavior intending the purposeful intimidation of governments or people to affect policy or behavior with an underlying political objective.

These common elements indicate that the United States has adopted a fairly narrow and legalistic approach to defining terrorism.

Types of Terrorism

The basic elements of terrorist typologies are uncomplicated. Experts and commentators generally agree on the forms of terrorism found in the modern political environment. Although different labels are sometimes affixed, the same typologies are repeatedly found in academic and policy analyses, and this subject is rather uncontroversial among experts. For example, the following typologies have been described by academic experts:

- Barkan and Snowden describe vigilante, insurgent, transnational, and state terrorism.³⁶
- Hoffman discusses ethno-nationalist/separatist, international, religious, and state-sponsored terrorism.³⁷
- While undertaking the task of defining the New Terrorism, Laqueur contextualizes far rightist, religious, state, “exotic,” and criminal terrorism.³⁸
- Other experts evaluate narco-terrorism, toxic terrorism, and netwar.³⁹

We will explore all of these typologies in later chapters within the following contexts:

State Terrorism. Terrorism “from above” committed by governments against perceived enemies. State terrorism can be directed externally against adversaries in the international domain or internally against domestic enemies.

Dissident Terrorism. Terrorism “from below” committed by nonstate movements and groups against governments, ethno-national groups, religious groups, and other perceived enemies.

Religious Terrorism. Terrorism motivated by an absolute belief that an otherworldly power has sanctioned—and commanded—the application of terrorist violence for the greater glory of the faith.

34 TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

Criminal Terrorism. Terrorism motivated by sheer profit. Traditional organized criminal enterprises (such as the Mafia) accumulate profits from criminal activity for personal aggrandizement. Criminal-political enterprises (such as Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers) accumulate profits to sustain their movement.

International Terrorism. Terrorism that spills over onto the world's stage. Targets are selected because of their value as symbols of international interests.

A DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM: PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

It should now be clear that defining terrorism can be an exercise in semantics and context, driven by one's perspective and worldview. Absent definitional guidelines, these perspectives would be merely the subject of personal opinion and academic debate.

Perspective is a central consideration in defining terrorism. Those who oppose an extremist group's violent behavior—and who might be the targets of the group—would naturally consider them to be terrorists. On the other hand, those who are being championed by the group—and on whose behalf the terrorist war is being fought—often view them as liberation fighters; this can occur even when the championed people do not agree with the *methods* of the group. “The problem is that there exists no precise or widely accepted definition of terrorism.”⁴⁰ We will consider four perspectives that illustrate this problem. These perspectives are the following:

1. *Participants in a Terrorist Environment.* People who participate in, or are affected by, terrorist incidents are prone to have very different interpretations of the incident.
2. *Terrorism or Freedom Fighting?* Whether the classification of a group or movement as terrorists or freedom fighters is simply a question of one's perspective.
3. *Extremism or “Mainstreamism”?* Whether extremist behavior can move from the ideological fringes into a nation's or people's mainstream.
4. *Ideologies and Ideals.* Whether ideologies that promise a better future can justify terrorist behavior in the present.

Perspective 1: Participants in a Terrorist Environment

Motives, methods, and targets of violent extremists are interpreted differently by the **participants in a terrorist environment**. These participants can, and often do, draw their own subjective conclusions about violent political incidents regardless of the accepted formal definitions that have been crafted by officials or experts. Typically, the participants in a terrorist environment include the following actors, each of whom may advance different interpretations of an incident:⁴¹

The Terrorist. Terrorists are the perpetrators of a politically violent incident. The perspective of the terrorist is that the violent incident is a justifiable act of war against an oppressive opponent. “Insofar as terrorists seek to attract attention, they target the enemy public or uncommitted bystanders.”⁴² This is a legitimate tactic in their minds. They are never terrorists from their point of view.

The Supporter. Supporters of terrorists are patrons, in essence persons who provide a supportive environment or apparatus. Supporters will generally refer to the terrorist

participants as freedom fighters. Even if supporters disagree with the use of force or with the application of force in a specific incident, they will often rationalize its use as the unfortunate consequence of a just war.

The Victim. Victims of political violence, and of warfare, will rarely sympathize with the perpetrators of that violence, regardless of the underlying motive. From their perspective, the perpetrators are little better than terrorists.

The Target. Targets are usually symbolic. They represent some feature of the enemy and can be either property targets or human targets. As is the case with the victim, human targets will rarely sympathize with the perpetrators.

The Onlooker. Onlookers are the broad audience to the terrorist incident. They can be directly affected by the incident at the scene of an attack or indirectly affected via modern mass media. The onlooker may either sympathize with the perpetrators, revile them, or remain neutral. Depending on the worldview of the onlooker, he or she might actually applaud a specific incident or a general dissident environment. Television is a particularly effective medium for broadening the scope of who is an onlooker. This was evident during the live broadcasts of the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.

The Analyst. The analyst is an interpreter of the terrorist incident. Analysts are important participants because they create perspectives, interpret incidents, and label the other participants. Analysts can include political leaders, media experts, and academic experts. Very often, the analyst will simply define for the other participants who is—or is not—a terrorist.

Many factors shape the perspectives of terrorists, supporters, victims, targets, onlookers, and analysts. These factors include culture, collective history, individual experiences, and group identity. The same terrorist event can be interpreted in a number of different ways by participants, thus causing them to adopt biased spins on events. The following factors illustrate this problem:

- *Political associations* of participants can create a sense of identification with either the target group or the defended group. This identification can be either favorable or unfavorable, depending on the political association.
- *Emotional responses* of participants after a terrorist incident can range from horror to joy. This response can shape a participant's opinion of the incident or the extremists' cause.
- *Labeling* of participants can create either a positive or negative impression of an incident or cause. Labeling can range from creating very positive symbolism on behalf of the terrorists to the dehumanization of enemy participants (including civilians).
- *Symbolism* plays an important role in the terrorists' selection of targets. The targets can be inanimate objects that symbolize a government's power or human victims who symbolize an enemy people. Other participants sometimes make value judgments on the incident based on the symbolism of the target, thus asking whether the selected target was legitimate or illegitimate.

Perspective 2: Terrorism or Freedom Fighting?

The second perspective for understanding terrorism is the question of whether the use of political violence is terrorism or freedom fighting. Members of politically violent

36 TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

organizations will rarely label themselves as terrorists. Instead, they adopt the language of liberation, national identity, and even democracy. Ethno-nationalist and religious organizations such as **Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)** in Israel, **Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)** in Sri Lanka, and the **Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provos)** in the United Kingdom all declare that they are armies fighting on behalf of an oppressed people, and they are viewed by their supporters as **freedom fighters**. Conversely, many Israelis, Sinhalese, and British would label members of these groups as terrorists.

The declarations published by these and other organizations are in the language of liberation and freedom. For example, the Palestinian Information Center explained that

Hamas is an acronym that stands for the Islamic Resistance Movement, a popular national resistance movement which is working to create conditions conducive to emancipating the Palestinian people, delivering them from tyranny, liberating their land from the occupying usurper, and to stand up to the Zionist scheme which is supported by neo-colonist forces. . . . Hamas . . . is part of the Islamic awakening movement and upholds that this awakening is the road which will lead to the liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea. It is also a popular movement in the sense that it is a practical manifestation of a wide popular current that is deeply rooted in the ranks of the Palestinian people and the Islamic nation.⁴³

Likewise, the leader of the LTTE delivered the following remarks on November 27, 2001, the LTTE's Heroes' Day:

The Tamil people want to maintain their national identity and to live in their own lands, in their historically given homeland with peace and dignity. They want to determine their own political and economic life; they want to be on their own. These are the basic political aspirations of the Tamil people. It is neither separatism nor terrorism.⁴⁴

Despite the seemingly noble aspirations embodied in the Hamas and LTTE statements, both conflicts have been markedly violent and have included many assassinations and terrorist bombings, as well as thousands of deaths. However, as ruthless as the LTTE and Hamas organizations have been, their opponents—the Sri Lankan and Israeli governments—have regularly applied repressive measures against them, including physically coercive interrogations and assassinations. This repression has fueled fresh support for the rebellions.

Sinn Féin, the aboveground Irish republican political party that champions the unification of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland, remarked in a statement titled "The Conditions for Peace in Ireland,"

The root cause of the conflict in Ireland is the denial of democracy, the refusal by the British government to allow the Irish people to exercise their right to national self-determination. The solution to the conflict in Ireland lies in the democratic exercise of that right in the form of national reunification, national independence and sovereignty.⁴⁵

Although Sinn Féin participated in the successful brokering of a peace agreement between the Provos and their opponents, it has historically championed many of the Provos' "martyrs" and their common goal of unification.

These cases exemplify the important role of perspective in defining one's champions or opponents, and how the absence of a definitional model relegates the debate of terrorism or freedom fighting to one of opposing values and opinions.

Perspective 3: Extremism or “Mainstreamism”?

The third perspective for understanding terrorism is the question of whether political violence always lies at the political fringes of society, or whether it is in fact a rational choice of some mainstream. Members of organizations such as Hamas, the LTTE, and the Provos (prior to the peace accord) readily acknowledge that their methods are extreme but justify them as being proportional to the force used by the agents of their oppressors. In Colombia, the **Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)** argued that the Colombian government’s response to FARC peace initiatives

was to strengthen the quasi-official death squads, the most despicable form of extermination. In this way, they cold-bloodedly annihilated the opposition political parties, union leaders, defenders of human rights, priests, peasant leaders and democratic personalities, among others. . . . From the moment a new agreement was made with President Andres Pastrana to establish the talks at San Vicente del Caguan on Jan. 7, 1999, the savagery grew. No week passed without a massacre, a murder or a forced evacuation, all done in the name of the paramilitaries but planned in the military bases. It is the realization of the imperialist doctrine of internal security.⁴⁶

Governments have also adopted authoritarian measures to counter domestic threats from perceived subversives. They likewise rationalize their behavior as a proportional response to an immediate threat. Both the Chilean and Argentine armed forces seized power during the 1970s and engaged in widespread violent repression of dissidents. An estimated 30,000 people disappeared in Argentina during the so-called **Dirty War** waged by its military government from 1976 to 1983. The Chilean and Argentine cases are explored further in Chapter 7.

Thus, from the perspective of many violent groups and governments, extremist beliefs and terrorist methods are logical and necessary. These beliefs and methods become mainstreamed within the context of their worldview and political environment, which in their minds offer no alternative to using violence to acquire freedom or to maintain order. Conversely, those who oppose the practitioners of political violence reject their justifications of terrorist methods and disavow the opinion that these methods are morally proportional to the perceived political environment.

Perspective 4: Ideologies and Ideals

The fourth perspective for understanding terrorism involves the underlying ideologies and ideals that justify acts of political violence. It is not uncommon for members of ethno-nationalist and other organizations to justify their beliefs and behaviors by adopting an ideological ideal that promises a better and more just future.

Ideologies are *systems of belief*; they are derived from theories that explain human social and political conditions. Lowi describes one element of ideology as “a source of principles and a means of justifying behavior.”⁴⁷ Some ideologies are very intricate, intellectual, and dynamic, such as Marxism. Other ideologies are rather uncomplicated and straightforward, such as nationalism in East Africa,⁴⁸ the Balkans,⁴⁹ and elsewhere. And some ideologies are nothing more than paranoid conspiracy theories, such as the one-world-government and New World Order conspiracies underlying the Patriot movement in the United States.⁵⁰

Ideologies can constitute political, social, or economic programs. They can also constitute religious, racial, or ethnic systems of belief. The common attribute of all ideologies is that they guide the worldview and manner of living for individuals, groups, and nations.

Chapter Perspective 2.1**We the Klan Believe**

We believe in the eternal separation of the church and state:

Roman Catholicism teaches the union of church and state with the church controlling the state. . . .

Every Roman Catholic holds allegiance to the Pope of Rome, and Catholicism teaches that this allegiance is superior to his allegiance to his country. . . .

We believe in white supremacy:

The Klan believes that America is a white man's country, and should be governed by whitemen. Yet the Klan is not anti-Negro, it is the Negro's friend. The Klan is eternally opposed to the mixing of the white and colored

racess. Our creed: Let the white man remain white, the black man black, the yellow man yellow, the brown man brown, and the red man red. God drew the color line. . . .

The Klan believes in England for Englishmen, France for Frenchman, Italy for Italians, and America for Americans. . . . The Klan is not anti-Catholic, anti-Jew, anti-Negro, anti-foreign, the Klan is pro-Protestant and pro-American. . . .

We the Klan will never allow out [sic] blood bought liberties to be crucified on a Roman cross: and we will not yield to the integration of white and Negro races in our schools or any where else. . . .

Source: Excerpts from "The Principle [sic] of the United Klans of America." Tuscaloosa, AL: Office of the Imperial Wizard, 1974. In Sargent, Lyman Tower, ed. *Extremism in America: A Reader*. New York: New York University Press, 1995, p. 139. Reprinted by permission.

In their most extreme application, ideologies permit no deviation from their perceived truth and are completely intolerant of any criticism. Chapter Perspective 2.1 illustrates the rigid intolerance of one belief system.

Several ideologies are discussed in the following sections: **Anarchism**, **Marxism**, **Fascism**, and the **Just War Doctrine**. The underlying themes of these ideologies will be referenced in later chapters.

Anarchism

Anarchism is a leftist philosophy that was an ideological by-product of the social upheavals of mid-19th-century Europe, when civil unrest and class conflict swept the continent, culminating in the revolutions of 1848. Anarchists were among the first antiestablishment radicals who championed what they considered to be the downtrodden peasant and working classes. They abhorred central government control and private property. Frenchman **Pierre-Joseph Proudhon**, who published a number of articles and books on the virtues of anarchism, coined an enduring slogan among anarchists—"Property is theft!" In his 1840 publication *What is Property? An Inquiry Into the Principle of Right and of Government*, Proudhon wrote:

If I had to answer the following question, "What is slavery?" and if I should respond in one word, "It is murder," my meaning would be understood at once. I should not need a long explanation to show that the power to deprive a man of his thought, his will, and his personality is the power of life and death. So why to this other question, "What is property?" should I not answer in the same way, "It is theft," without fearing to be misunderstood.⁵¹

Thus, the radical undercurrent for anarchist thought began with the proposition that *property is theft*. **Mikhail Bakunin** and his philosophical associates **Sergei Nechayev** and **Petr Kropotkin**, all Russians, were the fathers of modern anarchism. They supported destruction of the state, radical decentralization of power, atheism, and individualism.

They opposed capitalism and Karl Marx's revolutionary doctrine of building a socialist state. Bakunin's theories had a particularly international influence.

Anarchists never offered a concrete plan for replacing centralized state authority. They were not concerned about building a clearly defined vision of postrevolutionary society. Instead, they considered the destruction of the state alone to be their contribution to the future. In the *Revolutionary Catechism*, Nechayev wrote:

The revolutionary . . . must have a single thought, a single goal—implacable destruction. Pursuing this goal coldly and relentlessly, he must be prepared to perish himself and to cause to perish, with his own hands, all those who would prevent him from achieving his goal.⁵²



A portrait of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the ideological father of anarchism. His slogan "Property is theft!" became a rallying cry for anarchists during the 19th and 20th centuries.

Source: Hulton Archive/Getty Images; used by permission.

Bakunin, Nechayev, and Kropotkin believed that revolutionary violence was needed to destroy capitalism and state socialism. Bakunin rejected publication of the cause through traditional media such as newspapers or leafleting. Instead, he advocated achieving propaganda victories by violently pursuing the revolution, which became known as **propaganda by the deed**. Terrorism was advocated as a principal means to destroy state authority. Interestingly, they argued that terrorists should organize themselves into small groups, or cells, a tactic that has been adopted by modern terrorists. Anarchists actively practiced propaganda by the deed. In Russia, **People's Will (Narodnaya Volya)** operated from 1878 to 1881, and other anarchist terrorist cells existed in Western Europe. Around the turn of the century, anarchists assassinated the Russian Czar Alexander II, Austro-Hungarian Empress Elizabeth, Italian King Umberto I, and French President Carnot. An alleged anarchist, Leon Czolgosz, assassinated the American President William McKinley.

These themes have been applied by modern left-wing terrorists and will be explored further in Chapter 5's review of nihilist dissident terrorism.

Marxism

Radical socialism, like anarchism, is a leftist ideology that began in the turmoil of mid-19th-century Europe and the uprisings of 1848. Socialists championed the emerging industrial working class and argued that the wealth produced by these workers should be more equitably distributed, rather than concentrated in the hands of the wealthy elite.

40 TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW



Architects of Communism: Russian revolutionary leader Vladimir Ilich Lenin (left) with Leon Trotsky, head of the Red Army and future ideological rival of Joseph Stalin.

Source: Hulton Archive/Getty Images; used by permission.

Karl Marx is regarded as the founder of modern socialism. He and his associate **Friedrich Engels**, both Germans, argued that their approach to socialism was grounded in the scientific “discovery” that human progress and social evolution is the result of a series of historical conflicts and revolutions. Each era was based on the working group’s unequal relationship to the means of production (e.g., slaves, feudal farmers, and industrial workers) vis-à-vis the ruling group’s enjoyment of the fruits of the working group’s labor. In each era, a ruling *thesis* group maintained the status quo and a laboring *antithesis* group challenged the status quo (through agitation and revolution), resulting in a socioeconomic *synthesis* that created new relationships with the means of production. Thus, human society evolved into the next era. According to Marx, the most advanced era of social evolution would be the synthesis Communist era, which Marx argued would be built after the antithesis industrial working class overthrows the thesis capitalist system. Marx theorized that the working class would establish the **Dictatorship of the Proletariat** in the Communist society and build a just and egalitarian social order.

Marx and Engels collaborated on the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, a short work completed in 1847 and published in 1848. It became one of the most widely read documents of the 20th century. In it, Marx and Engels explained the revolutionary environment

of the industrial era and how this era was an immediate precursor to the Communist era. They wrote,

The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!

Marxist socialism was pragmatic and revolutionary. It was action oriented and was adopted by many revolutionary leaders and movements throughout the 20th century. For example, **Vladimir Ilich Lenin** in Russia, **Mao Zedong** in China, **Ho Chi Minh** in Vietnam, and **Fidel Castro** in Cuba all based their revolutionary doctrines on Marx's precepts. Terrorism, both state and dissident, was used during these revolutions and during the consolidations of power after victory. It is interesting to note that none of the Marxist revolutions of the last century was led by the industrial working class; all occurred in preindustrial developing nations, often within the context of anticolonial warfare waged by peasants and farmers.

Marxism and class struggle will be explored further in Chapter 6's discussion of leftist ideologies.

Fascism

Fascism was a rightist ideological counterpoint to Marxism and anarchism that peaked prior to the Second World War. Its name is derived from the Latin word *fascēs*, which was a bundle of wooden rods bound together with an axe protruding from the center; it was the Roman imperial symbol of strength and power and was carried before processions of Roman officials.

Like Marxism and anarchism, fascism's popular appeal grew out of social turmoil in Europe, this time as a reaction to the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the subsequent Bolshevik-inspired political agitation elsewhere in Europe, and the widespread unrest during the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was rooted in a brand of extreme nationalism that championed the alleged superiority of a particular national heritage or ethno-racial group. Fascism was anti-Communist, anti-monarchist, anti-democratic, and anti-intellectual (although there were some fascist writers). It demanded extreme obedience to law, order, and the state. Fascism also required cultural conservatism—often looking backward in history to link the ancient past to the modern state—and it created its own conceptualizations of traditional values such as military duty, the Christian church, and motherhood. Strong antidemocratic leadership was centralized in the state, usually under the guidance of a single charismatic leader who symbolically embodied the virtues of the state, the people, and the underlying fascist ideology.

Italian dictator **Benito Mussolini** was the first to consolidate power and create a fascist state. Beginning with his March on Rome in 1922, he gradually eliminated all opposition and democratic institutions. He was a mentor for **Adolf Hitler**, who led the fascist National Socialist German Worker's (Nazi) Party to power in Germany in 1933. Both the German and Italian fascist regimes sent troops to fight on the side of right-wing Spanish rebels led by **Francisco Franco** during the Spanish Civil War.⁵³ These regimes represent three strains of fascism that reflect their own cultural and national idiosyncrasies:

1. *Italian Fascism* was nationalistic and expansionistic. It hearkened back to Italy's ancient past, seeking to symbolize the rise of a new Roman Empire. Mussolini sent his fascist legions on wars of conquest in Abyssinia, North Africa, the Balkans, and Greece.
2. *German Fascism* was also nationalistic and expansionistic. Unlike Italian fascism, the Nazis also practiced an ideology of racial supremacy. Nazism looked back to the

42 TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW



Architects of fascism: German *Führer* Adolf Hitler (front left) stands beside Italian *Duce* Benito Mussolini. Behind them are ranking members of the Nazi and Fascist regimes.

Source: Hulton Archive/Getty Images; used by permission.

Germanic peoples' ancient past, seeking to symbolize a time of Teutonic tribal and racial glory.

3. *Spanish Fascism* was also nationalistic but strongly rejected an expansionist ideology. The Franco regime successfully resisted intimidation from Adolf Hitler to enter the Second World War on the side of Germany and Italy. Spanish rightists looked to Spanish institutions and history to consolidate power domestically. They had a strong ideological influence in Latin America that lasted throughout the latter half of the 20th century.

The power of all three regimes was rooted in a strong political party, a leader, the military, and an organized elite. Fascist regimes during this period also took root in Hungary (1930s), Bulgaria (1934), and Romania (1938). Only Franco's regime survived the Second World War, lasting until his death in 1975.

Although the first fascist movement largely collapsed in 1945, right-wing groups and political parties have continued to promote neofascist ideals. Some terrorist groups in Europe and the United States have been overtly fascist and racist. Also, dictatorships have arisen since the Second World War that adopted many features of pre-War fascism. For example, Latin American regimes arose in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and El Salvador—that fit the fascist pattern.

Chapter Perspective 2.2 discusses the Spanish Falange, which long served as a model for repressive right-wing regimes and movements in Latin America.

Rightist ideologies and neofascism will be explored further in Chapter 4's discussion of domestic state terrorism and in Chapter 7's discussion of rightist ideology.

Chapter Perspective 2.2

The Spanish Falange: A Model for Fascism

The **Falange** party (pronounced “fä län’ kē” in Castilian Spanish) was born from the turmoil of 1930s Spain. A liberal democratic republic had been established when King Alfonso XIII abdicated in 1931. The republic was leftist in orientation, and strong agitation from the far left and the fringe left—anarcho-syndicalists,^a communists, and radical socialists—spread disorder in the capital city of Madrid and elsewhere. Fear grew that a Russian-style Bolshevik state might be established; this fear was especially strong among the upper classes, the military, the Catholic Church, and the middle class. In 1936, a rebellion among elite right-wing Spanish native troops and Foreign Legionnaires in Morocco sparked the Spanish Civil War, which lasted until 1939. This was a classic case of the depiction of the military as “national savior.” The war ended with the victory of the rightists.

The Spanish military was commanded by a Spanish traditionalist right-wing officer corps, many of whom had served in the recent—and bloody—colonial war in Spanish Morocco against the Moorish leader Abd el Krim.^b At the beginning of the rebellion, the Falange party was a small, traditionalist, and right-wing party. It was not overtly fascist in its orientation, but it championed the values of nationalism, the Catholic Church, order, motherhood, antiliberalism, anti-monarchism, and antileftism. Francisco Franco, the most prominent rebel general, was eventually accepted as **caudillo**, or leader, of the

rebellion. He successfully revamped the Falange to become his strongest base of support within his broader **Movimiento Nacional**.^c Falangist fascism was unique, because much of the rebels’ propaganda with its appeals to a heroic past, its stress on leadership, and insistence on a Spain untouched by “internationalism” such as Jewry or liberalism or freemasonry was Fascist in tone, but it scarcely went deeper than a justification for the persecution of freemasons and liberals.^d

Spanish Falangists were strong nationalists, and during the Second World War some even promoted the fantastic vision of reoccupying Latin America and the Philippines. Falangists formed the core of Francisco Franco’s political support apparatus. They were independent nationalists and kept their distance from the German Nazis and Italian Fascists during the Second World War, never entering the conflict other than to send one volunteer division—the **Blue Division**—to the Russian Front. This infuriated Adolf Hitler.

Hard-core Falangists could be fanatical, having adopted the slogan “**Long live death!**” during the rebellion against the Spanish Republic in the 1930s. Falangist ideology became popular among elites in Latin America and influenced the political behavior of these elites. Right-wing dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, and elsewhere were influenced by the Falangist example, and the militaries in these societies often adopted the mantle of national savior.

a. Anarcho-syndicalists were radical prolabor anarchists. They championed the working class and organized labor into anarchist “syndicate” groups. They believed that these syndicates would be the central means of organized cooperation after the revolution. Government would simply be a representative body of the syndicates.

b. Abd el Krim is a remarkable figure of the 20th century. His war against the Spanish colony in Morocco caused the deaths of thousands of Spanish troops, including 10,000 at Anual in June 1921. After defeating the Spaniards, he then turned against the French in their Moroccan possessions and essentially fought them to a stalemate. He was eventually defeated by combined French and Spanish forces in 1926. Abd el Krim was exiled under honorable terms to the French island of Réunion. He died in 1963.

c. *Movimiento Nacional* was a coalition of “monarchists, conservatives, business, and the more energetically radical social fascists of the Falange.” Campbell, Christopher. “Franco’s Spain.” In Cross, R. W., ed. *20th Century*. London: Purnell Reference Books, 1979, p. 2349.

d. Thomas, Hugh. “The Spanish Civil War.” In Cross, R. W., ed. *20th Century*. London: Purnell Reference Books, 1979, p. 1602.

The Just War Doctrine

The just war doctrine is an ideal and a moralistic philosophy rather than an ideology. The concept has been used by ideological and religious extremists to justify acts of extreme violence. Throughout history, nations and individuals have gone to war with the

44 TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

belief that their cause was just and their opponents' cause unjust. Similarly, attempts have been made for millennia to write fair and just laws of war and rules of engagement. For example, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the **Hague Conventions** produced at least 21 international agreements on the rules of war.⁵⁴

This is a moral and ethical issue that raises the questions of whether one can ethically attack an opponent, how one can justifiably defend oneself, and what types of force are morally acceptable in either context. The just war debate also asks who can morally be defined as an enemy and what kinds of targets it is morally acceptable to attack. In this regard,

There are two separate components to the concept of just war (which philosophers call the just war tradition): the rationale for initiating the war (war's ends) and the method of warfare (war's means). Criteria for whether a war is just are divided into *jus ad bellum* (justice of war) and *jus in bello* (justice in war) criteria.⁵⁵

Thus, *jus in bello* is correct behavior while waging war, and *jus ad bellum* are correct conditions for waging war in the first place. These concepts have been debated by philosophers and theologians for centuries. The early Christian philosopher **Augustine** concluded in the 5th century that war is justified to punish injuries inflicted by a nation that has refused to correct wrongs committed by its citizens. The Christian religious tradition, especially the Roman Catholic Church, has devoted a great deal of intellectual effort to clarifying Augustine's concept. Augustine was, of course, referring to warfare between nations and cities, and Church doctrine long held that an attack against state authority was an offense against God.⁵⁶ Likewise, the Hague Conventions dealt only with rules of conflict between nations and afforded no legal rights to spies or antistate rebels. Neither system referred to rules of engagement for nonstate or antistate conflicts.

In the modern era, both dissidents and states have adapted the just war tradition to their political environments. Antistate conflict and reprisals by states are commonplace. Dissidents always consider their cause just and their methods proportional to the force used by the agents of their oppressors. They are, in their own minds, freedom fighters waging a just war. As one Hamas fighter said, "Before I start shooting, I start to concentrate on reading verses of the Koran because the Koran gives me the courage to fight the Israelis."⁵⁷

Antiterrorist reprisals launched by states are also justified as appropriate and proportional applications of force—in this case as a means to root out bands of terrorists. For example, after three suicide bombers killed or wounded scores of people in Jerusalem and Haifa in December 2001, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon justified Israeli reprisals by saying,

A war of terrorism was forced on us [by the terrorists]. . . . If you ask what the aim of this war is, I will tell you. It is the aim of the terrorists . . . to exile us from here. . . . This will not happen.⁵⁸

From the perspective of terrorism and counterterrorism, both dissident and state applications of force are legitimate subjects of just war scrutiny, especially because dissidents usually attack soft civilian targets and state reprisals are usually not directed against standing armies. The following "moral checklist" was published in the American newspaper *The Christian Science Monitor* during the first phase of the antiterrorism war begun after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks:

- Is it justified to attack states and overturn regimes to get at terrorists?
- Can the U.S. legitimately target political figures like Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar?
- What are U.S. obligations in terms of minimizing civilian casualties?
- What type of force should be used?

Table 2.3 A Comparison of Ideologies

Social conflict in the 20th century was deeply rooted in the application of ideals and ideologies to practice. The adoption of these social and philosophical systems frequently inspired individuals and motivated movements to engage in armed conflict with perceived enemies. The following table matches proponents, outcomes, and case studies of four ideals and ideologies.

	<i>Ideological Orientation</i>			
	<i>Anarchism</i>	<i>Marxism</i>	<i>Fascism</i>	<i>Just War</i>
<i>Proponents</i>	Proudhon/Bakunin	Marx/Engels	Mussolini/Hitler	Augustine
<i>Desired Social Outcome</i>	Stateless society	Dictatorship of the Proletariat	New order	Legitimized conflict
<i>Applications</i>	People's Will (Narodnaya Volya)	Russian Revolution	WWII-era Italy and Germany	State and dissident violence

- When should U.S. forces take prisoners, rather than killing Afghan troops?
- Is there a plan for peace?⁵⁹

These questions are generically applicable to all state antiterrorist campaigns, as well as to antistate dissident violence. It is important to remember that rules of war and the just war tradition are the result of many motivations. Some rules and justifications are self-serving, others are pragmatic, and others are grounded in ethno-nationalist or religious traditions. Hence, the just war concept can be easily adapted to justify ethnic, racial, national, and religious extremism in the modern era.

Table 2.3 summarizes the ideals and ideologies discussed here.

THE POLITICAL VIOLENCE MATRIX

Experts have identified and analyzed many typologies of terrorism. As students will learn in the chapters that follow, these typologies include dissident, state, international, criminal, religious, ideological, and ethno-nationalist terrorism. One distinguishing feature within each typology is the relationship between the *quality of force* used by the terrorists and the *characteristics of the victim* of the attack. Figure 2.1 depicts how this relationship (quality of force and victim characteristics) often defines the type of conflict involving the terrorist and victim.⁶⁰

A Definitional Dilemma: Combatants, Noncombatants, and the Use of Force

Definitional and ethical issues are not always clearly drawn when one uses terms such as *combatant*, *noncombatant*, *discriminate force*, or *indiscriminate force*.

Combatants and Noncombatants

The term *combatants* certainly refers to conventional or unconventional adversaries who engage in armed conflict as members of regular military or irregular guerrilla fighting units. The term *noncombatants* obviously includes civilians who have no connection

46 TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

When force (whether conventional or unconventional) is used against combatants, it occurs in a warfare environment. When force is used against *noncombatants* or *passive military* targets, it often characterizes a terrorist environment. Violent environments can be broadly classified as follows:

- **Total War:** Force is indiscriminately applied to destroy the military targets of an enemy combatant to absolutely destroy them.
- **Total War/Unrestricted Terrorism:** Indiscriminate force is applied against noncombatants without restraint, either by a government or by dissidents.
- **Limited War:** Discriminating force is used against a combatant, either to defeat the enemy or to achieve a more limited political goal.
- **State Repression/Restricted Terrorism:** Discriminating force is directed against noncombatants either as a matter of domestic policy or as the selective use of terrorism by dissidents.

The following figure summarizes factors to be considered when evaluating the application of different scales of force against certain types of targets.

Indiscriminate force, Combatant	Total war (WWII Eastern Front)	Limited war (Korean War)	Discriminate force, Combatant
Indiscriminate force, Noncombatant	Total war (WWII bombing of cities) Unrestricted terrorism (Rwandan genocide)	State repression (Argentine “Dirty War”) Restricted terrorism (Italian Red Brigades)	Discriminate force, Noncombatant

Figure 2.1 The Political Violence Matrix

to military or other security forces. There are, however, circumstances in which these definitional lines become blurred. For example, in times of social unrest, civilians can become combatants. This has occurred repeatedly in societies where communal violence (e.g., civil war) breaks out between members of ethno-national, ideological, or religious groups. Similarly, noncombatants can include off-duty members of the military in nonwarfare environments.⁶¹ They become targets because of their symbolic status.

Indiscriminate and Discriminate Force

Indiscriminate force is the application of force against a target without attempting to limit the level of force or the degree of destruction of the target. *Discriminate force* is a more surgical use of limited force. Indiscriminate force is considered to be acceptable when used against combatants in a warfare environment. However, it is regularly condemned when used in *any* nonwarfare environment regardless of the characteristics of the victim.⁶² There are, however, many circumstances when adversaries define “warfare environment” differently. When weaker adversaries resort to unconventional methods (including terrorism), they justify these methods by defining them as being necessary during a self-defined state of war. Discriminate force is considered to be a moral use of force when it is applied against specific targets with the intention to limit so-called collateral damage, or unintended destruction and casualties (this concept is explored further in Chapter 9).

Case in Point Are “Hate Crimes” Acts of Terrorism?

Hate crime is a legalistic concept that is given a variety of labels and definitions. They are sometimes considered to be crimes but at other times seem to fit the definition of acts of terrorism. Hate crimes laws in the United States and elsewhere are a criminological approach to a specific kind of deviant behavior. These laws focus on a certain type of motive for criminal behavior—behavior that is directed against protected classes of people (as defined in the laws) *because of* their membership in these protected classes. Thus, hate crimes are officially considered to be a law enforcement issue to be dealt with by law enforcement agencies.

The definitional debate about what is or is not “terrorism” has resulted in a large number of official and unofficial definitions. A similar definitional debate has arisen about how to define hate crimes, because “it is difficult to construct an exhaustive definition of the term. . . . Crime—hate crime included—is relative.”^a In fact, there is no agreement on what label to use for behaviors that many people commonly refer to as “hate crimes”; for example,

In the United States, attacks by white neo-Nazi youth against African-Americans, gays, and religious institutions have been referred to with such diverse terms as *hate crime*, *hate-motivated crime*, *bias crime*, *bias-motivated crime* and *ethno-violence*.^b

Are hate crimes acts of terrorism? Terrorism requires an underlying political agenda for the violent act. In this regard, *not all acts of terrorism are hate crimes*, and *not all hate crimes are acts of terrorism*. For example, dissident terrorists frequently target a state or system with little or no animus against a particular race, religion, or other group. Likewise, state terrorism is often motivated by a perceived need to preserve or reestablish the state’s defined vision of social order without targeting a race, religion, or other group. On the other hand, criminal behavior fitting federal or state definitions of hate crimes in the United States can have little or no identifiable political agenda, other than animus toward a protected class of people.

It is when political violence is directed against a particular group—such as a race, nationality, religion, or generalized “undesirable”—that these acts possibly fit the definitions of both hate crimes and terrorism. Terrorists often launch attacks against people who generally symbolize the cause that they oppose. In the United States and elsewhere, many individuals and groups act out violently to promote an agenda that seeks to “purify” society. These crimes are committed by groups or individuals who are “dealing in the artificial currency of . . . ‘imagined communities’—utopian pipe dreams and idealizations of ethnically cleansed communities.”^c For example, after German reunification, “street renegades [demanded] a new *Lebensraum* of a purified Germany whose national essence and coherence will not be weakened and ‘contaminated’ by ethnic and racial minorities.”^d Their targeted enemies were Turkish, Slavic, and southern European foreigners and “guest workers.”

The separation between hate crimes and terrorism is not always clear. “Hate groups at times in their life cycles might resemble gangs and at other times paramilitary organizations or terrorist groups.”^e Thus, “hate groups are another example of small, intense groups that sometimes resort to violence to achieve their goals by committing . . . *vigilante terrorism*.”^f This kind of perspective raises interesting questions about our perceptions of political violence. For example, are the following incidents acts of terrorism or hate crimes?

- “Lone wolf” attacks by racially motivated individuals
- Massacres of “enemy” civilians by paramilitaries
- Communal violence between religions or ethno-nationalist groups
- Genocidal campaigns by governments or ethno-nationalist groups

NOTES

a. Perry, Barbara. *In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes*. New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 8.

b. Hamm, Mark S. “Conceptualizing Hate Crime in a Global Context.” In Hamm, Mark S., ed. *Hate Crime: International Perspectives on Causes and Control*. Highland Heights, KY: Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences and Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1994, p. 174.

c. Kelly, Robert J., and Jess Maghan. *Hate Crime: The Global Politics of Polarization*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1998, p. 6. Citing Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: New Left, 1983.

d. Kelly and Maghan (see note c), p. 5.

e. Barkan, Steven E., and Lynne L. Snowden. *Collective Violence*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2001, p. 105.

f. Barkan and Snowden (see note e), p. 106.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter presented students with an understanding of the nature of terrorism and probed the definitional debates about the elements of these behaviors. Several fundamental concepts were identified that continue to influence the motives and behaviors of those who support or engage in political violence. For example, the classical ideological continuum is still a useful model for understanding the political behavior of many individuals, groups, and movements. It is also useful for contextualizing the justifications used by the actors for their behavior.

It is important to understand the elements that help define terrorism. Common characteristics of the extremist beliefs that underlie terrorist behavior include intolerance, moral absolutes, broad conclusions, and a new language that supports a particular belief system. Literally scores of definitions of terrorism have been offered by laypersons, academics, and policy professionals to describe the elements of terrorist violence. Many of these definitions are value laden and can depend on one's perspective as an actor in a terrorist environment.

The role of perspective is significant in the definitional debate. Terrorists always declare that they are fighters who represent the interests of an oppressed group. They consider themselves to be freedom fighters and justify their violence as a proportional response to the object of their oppression. Their supporters will often "mainstream" the motives of those who violently champion their cause. In addition, the underlying principles of long-standing ideologies and philosophies—we discussed anarchism, Marxism, fascism, and the "just war"—continue to provide justifications for the support and use of political violence.

In the United States, official definitions have been adopted as a matter of policy. No single definition has been applied across all government agencies, but there is some commonality among their approaches. Commonalities include premeditation, unlawfulness, groups or agents, force or violence, human or property targets, intimidation, and a political objective.

In Chapter 3, students will investigate the causes of terrorism. The discussion will focus on the motivations of terrorists, explanations of terrorist behavior, and cases in point that illustrate causal factors in the making of a terrorist.

KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

The following topics were discussed in this chapter and are found in the Glossary:

American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan	Fascism
Anarchism	Franco, Francisco
Augustine	Freedom fighter
Bakunin, Mikhail	Fringe left
Berrigan, Daniel and Philip	Fringe right
Blue Division, The	Guevara, Ernesto "Che"
Castro, Fidel	Hague Conventions
<i>Caudillo</i>	Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)
Conservatism	Hate Crimes
Dictatorship of the Proletariat	Hitler, Adolf
Dirty War	Ho Chi Minh
Engels, Friedrich	<i>Jus ad bellum</i>
Ensslin, Gudrun	<i>Jus in bello</i>
Extremism	Just war doctrine
Falange	Kropotkin, Petr
Far left	Lenin, Vladimir Ilich
Far right	Liberalism
<i>Fasces</i>	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Long live death!	Propaganda by the deed
<i>Manifesto of the Communist Party</i>	Property is theft
Mao Zedong	Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph
Marx, Karl	Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provos)
Marxism	Radical
Moderate center	Reactionary
<i>Movimiento Nacional</i>	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Mussolini, Benito	<i>Revolutionary Catechism</i>
People's Will (Narodnaya Volya)	Sinn Féin
Nechayev, Sergei	Terrorism
New Terrorism	Terrorist
Participants in a Terrorist Environment	

RECOMMENDED WEB SITES

The following Web sites illustrate the classical ideological continuum and the nature of extremism.

British National Party: www.bnp.org.uk/links.html
 Council of Conservative Citizens: www.cofcc.org
 Earth First! Radical Environmental Journal: www.earthfirstjournal.org
 Front National (France): www.frontnational.com
 Socialist Party USA: www.sp-usa.org

WEB EXERCISE

Using this chapter's recommended Internet sites, conduct an online investigation of the fundamental characteristics of extremism.

- What commonalities can you find in the statements of these groups?
- Is there anything that strikes you as being particularly extremist?
- Why or why not?

For an online search of different approaches to defining extremism and terrorism, students should activate the search engine on their Web browser and enter the following keywords:

"Definitions of Terrorism"
 "Extremism"

RECOMMENDED READINGS

The following publications provide discussions for defining terrorism and terrorism's underlying extremist motivations.

Hamm, Mark S., ed. *Hate Crime: International Perspectives on Causes and Control*. Highland Heights, KY: Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences and Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1994.
 Howard, Lawrence, ed. *Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses*. New York: Praeger, 1992.
 Laqueur, Walter. *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
 Lawrence, Frederick M. *Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes Under American Law*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
 Sederberg, Peter C. *Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989.

Discussion Box

Cold War Revolutionaries

This chapter's Discussion Box is intended to stimulate critical debate about the role of perspective in labeling those who practice extremist behavior as "freedom fighters" or "terrorists."

The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union lasted from the late 1940s until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. During the roughly 40 years of rivalry, the two superpowers never entered into direct military conflict—at least conventionally. Rather, they supported insurgent and government allies in the developing world (commonly referred to as the "Third World"),^a who often entered into armed conflict. These conflicts could be ideological or communal in nature. Conflicts were often "proxy wars," wherein the Soviets or Americans sponsored rival insurgent groups (such as in Angola), or "wars of national liberation," which were nationalistic in nature (such as in Vietnam).

The following examples illustrate how Cuba became an important "front" in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Cuban Revolution

The American influence in Cuba had been very strong since it granted the country independence in 1902 after defeating the Spanish in the Spanish-American War of 1898. The United States supported a succession of corrupt and repressive governments, the last of which was that of Fulgencio Batista. Batista's government was overthrown in 1959 by a guerrilla army led by Fidel Castro and **Ernesto "Che" Guevara**, an Argentine trained as a physician. Castro's insurgency had begun rather unremarkably, with significant defeats at the Moncada barracks in 1953 and a landing on the southeast coast of Cuba from Mexico in 1956 (when only 15 rebels survived to seek refuge in the Sierra Maestra mountains).

It was Batista's brutal reprisals against urban civilians that eventually drove many Cubans to support Castro's movement. When Batista's army was defeated and demoralized in a rural offensive against the rebels, Castro, his brother Raul, Guevara, and Camilo Cienfuegos launched a multifront campaign that ended in victory when their units converged in the capital of Havana in January 1959. The revolution had not been a Communist revolution, and the new Cuban government was not initially a Communist government. But by early 1960, Cuba began to receive strong economic and military support from the Soviet Union. Castro and his followers soon declared the revolution to be a Communist one, and the Soviet-American Cold War opened a new and volatile front. American attempts to subvert Castro's regime included the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 and several assassination attempts against Castro.^b The Soviets and Americans came close to war during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.

Cubans in Africa

In the post-War era, dozens of anticolonial and communal insurgencies occurred in Africa. During the 1970s, Africa became a central focus of the rivalry between Soviet- and Western-supported groups and governments. Thousands of Cuban soldiers were sent to several African countries on a mission that Fidel Castro justified as their "internationalist duty." For example, in the 1970s Cuba sent 20,000 soldiers to Angola, 17,000 to Ethiopia, 500 to Mozambique, 250 to Guinea-Bissau, 250 to Equatorial Guinea, and 125 to Libya.^c

Angola

Portugal was the colonial ruler of this southern Africa country for more than 500 years. Beginning in 1961, guerillas began conducting raids in northern Angola, committing brutal atrocities that few can argue were not acts of terrorism. Three guerrilla movements eventually drove the Portuguese from Angola and declared independence in November 1975. These were the Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

In the civil war that broke out after the Portuguese withdrawal, the United States and China supported the FNLA, the Soviets and Cubans supported the MPLA, and the United States and South Africa supported UNITA. The MPLA became the de facto government of Angola. Cuban soldiers were sent to support the MPLA government, the United States and South Africa sent aid to UNITA, and South African and British mercenaries fought with UNITA. The FNLA never achieved much success in the field. Direct foreign support was withdrawn as the Cold War and South African apartheid ended, although the conflict continued through the 1990s. The MPLA finally forced UNITA to end its insurgency when UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was killed in February 2002.

Nicaragua

U.S. influence and intervention in Nicaragua were common during most of the 20th century. Its governments had been supported by the United States, and its National Guard (the "Guardia") had been trained by the United States. These pro-American Nicaraguan governments had a long history of corruption and violent repression. Cuban-oriented Marxist guerrillas, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, overthrew the government of Anastasio Somoza in 1979 with Cuban and Soviet assistance.

During much of the next decade, the United States armed, trained, and supported anti-Sandinista guerrillas known as the Contras ("counterrevolutionaries"). This support included clandestine military shipments managed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the mining of Managua harbor, and an illegal arms-shipment program managed by Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North.

Discussion Questions

- Che Guevara is revered by many on the left as a "principled" revolutionary. He believed that a revolutionary "spark" was needed to create revolution throughout Latin America. Guevara was killed in Bolivia trying to prove his theory. Was Che Guevara an internationalist freedom fighter?
- The United States used sabotage to destabilize Cuba's economy and government and plotted to assassinate Fidel Castro. Did the United States engage in state-sponsored terrorism? Compare this to Soviet support of *their* allies. Is there a difference?
- The Soviet Union sponsored the Cuban troop presence in Africa during the 1970s. The wars in Angola, Ethiopia/Somalia, and Mozambique were particularly bloody. Did the Soviet Union engage in state-sponsored terrorism? Compare this to the United States' support of *their* allies. Is there a difference?
- During the Soviet–United States rivalry in Angola, Jonas Savimbi commanded the pro-Western UNITA army. He was labeled as a freedom fighter by his U.S. patrons. Savimbi never overthrew the MPLA government. Promising efforts to share power after an election in 1992 ended in the resumption of the war when Savimbi refused to acknowledge his electoral defeat, and a 1994 cease-fire collapsed. From the U.S. perspective, has Jonas Savimbi's status as a freedom fighter changed? If so, when and how?
- The Sandinistas overthrew a violent and corrupt government. The Contras were presented by the Reagan administration as an army of freedom fighters fighting against a totalitarian Communist government. Contra atrocities against civilians were documented. Were the Contras freedom fighters? How do their documented atrocities affect your opinion?

NOTES

a. At the time, the First World was defined as the developed Western democracies, the Second World was the Soviet bloc, and the Third World was the developing world, composed of newly emerging postcolonial nations.

b. At least one plot allegedly proposed using an exploding cigar.

c. See Cross, R. W., ed. *20th Century*, London: Purnell Reference Books, 1979, p. 2365, and "The OAU and the New Scramble for Africa," pp. 2372-2373.

52 TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

NOTES

- ¹ Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, pp. 25-26.
- ² Laqueur, Walter. *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 230.
- ³ Kellen, Konrad. "Ideology and Rebellion: Terrorism in West Germany." In Reich, Walter, ed. *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998, p. 57.
- ⁴ See Ellis, Harry B. *Ideals and Ideologies: Communism, Socialism, and Capitalism*. New York: World, 1972.
- ⁵ See Cobban, Alfred. *A History of Modern France*. New York: Penguin Books, 1965.
- ⁶ Pryce, Roy. "Italy, the New Republic." In Cross, R. W., ed. *20th Century*. London: Purnell Reference Books, 1979, p. 2109 ff.
- ⁷ Murphy, Brian. "Achieving a United Europe." In Cross, R. W., ed. *20th Century*. London: Purnell Reference Books, 1979, p. 2344.
- ⁸ Lowi, Theodore J. *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority*. New York: Norton, 1969, p. 71.
- ⁹ Clinton, Rossiter. *Conservatism in America*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955. p. 12. Quoted in Lowi (note 8 above), p. 56.
- ¹⁰ Weinberg, Leonard. "An Overview of Right-Wing Extremism in the Western World: A Study of Convergence, Linkage, and Identity." In Kaplan, Jeffrey, and Tore Bjørge, eds. *Nation and Race: The Developing Euro-American Racist Subculture*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998, p. 8 ff.
- ¹¹ Ibid., p. 10.
- ¹² Ibid., p. 11.
- ¹³ Laqueur (note 2 above), p. 81.
- ¹⁴ Laqueur (note 2 above), p. 82.
- ¹⁵ *Webster's New Twentieth-Century Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged*, 2d ed. New York: Publishers Guild, 1966.
- ¹⁶ Scruton, Roger. *A Dictionary of Political Thought*. New York: Hill & Wang, 1982, p. 164.
- ¹⁷ For a good biography of the Berrigan brothers, see Polner, Murray, and Jim O'Grady. *Disarmed and Dangerous: The Radical Life and Times of Daniel and Philip Berrigan, Brothers in Religious Faith and Civil Disobedience*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.
- ¹⁸ Remarks of Jeff Berry, Imperial Wizard of the American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Butler, Pennsylvania, March 1998. Quoted in Weller, Worth H., and Brad Thompson. *Under the Hood: Unmasking the Modern Ku Klux Klan*. North Manchester, IN: DeWitt Books, 1998, pp. 40-41.
- ¹⁹ For an excellent list of traits of extremists, see Wilcox, Laird. "What Is Extremism? Style and Tactics Matter More Than Goals." In George, John, and Laird Wilcox. *Nazis, Communists, Klansmen, and Others on the Fringe*. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992, pp. 54 ff.
- ²⁰ For references to the Cuban perspective, see Kenner, Martin, and James Petras. *Fidel Castro Speaks*. New York: Grove Press, 1969.
- ²¹ Kushner, Harvey W., ed. *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998, pp. 125, 126.
- ²² Goldberg, Jeffrey. "Inside Jihad U.: The Education of a Holy Warrior." *New York Times Magazine*. June 25, 2000, p. 35.
- ²³ See Schmid, Alex P., and Albert J. Jongman. *Political Terrorism*. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1988. The book reports the results of a survey of 100 experts asked for their definitions of terrorism.
- ²⁴ Whittaker, David J., ed. *The Terrorism Reader*. New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 8.
- ²⁵ Whittaker (note 24 above), p. 1.
- ²⁶ Office for the Protection of the Constitution, *ibid*.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Gurr, Ted Robert. "Political Terrorism: Historical Antecedents and Contemporary Trends." In Gurr, Ted Robert, ed. *Violence in America: Protest, Rebellion, Reform*, vol. 2. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989.

²⁹ Gibbs, J. P. "Conceptualization of Terrorism." *American Sociological Review* 54 (1989): 329. Quoted in Hamm, Mark S., ed. *Hate Crime: International Perspectives on Causes and Control*. Highland Heights, KY: Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences and Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1994, p. 111.

³⁰ Hoffman (note 1 above), p. 43.

³¹ Whittaker (note 24 above), p. 8.

³² U.S. Departments of the Army and the Air Force. *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*. Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 1990, p. 3-1.

³³ 18 U.S.C. 3077.

³⁴ Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, National Security Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation. *Terrorism in the United States 1995*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1996, p. ii.

³⁵ Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996*. U.S. Department of State Publication 10433. Washington, DC: State Department, 1997, p. vi.

³⁶ Barkan, Steven E., and Lynne L. Snowden. *Collective Violence*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2001.

³⁷ Hoffman (note 1 above).

³⁸ Laqueur (note 2 above).

³⁹ Ehrenfeld, Rachel. *Narco Terrorism*. Basic Books, 1990; Tucker, Jonathan B., ed. *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000; Tucker, Jonathan B., ed. *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.

⁴⁰ Riley, Kevin Jack, and Bruce Hoffman. *Domestic Terrorism: A National Assessment of State and Local Preparedness*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995, p. 2.

⁴¹ Weimann and Winn mention the following societal participants in media events: the direct victims, the terrorists, the broadcasting audience, journalists, and governments. Weimann, Gabriel, and Conrad Winn. *The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism*. New York: Longman, 1994, p. 104.

⁴² Paletz, David L., and Alex P. Schmid. *Terrorism and the Media*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992, p. 179.

⁴³ Palestinian Information Center. Hamas Web site, www.palestine-info.com (date accessed: November 30, 2001).

⁴⁴ Velupillai Pirapaharan. Tamil Eelam Web site: www.eelam.com (date accessed: November 28, 2001).

⁴⁵ Sinn Féin. "Freedom: A Sinn Féin Education Publication." Sinn Féin Online: <http://sinnfein.ie> (date accessed: November 30, 2001).

⁴⁶ Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. Resistencia page on the FARC Web site: www.contrast.org/mirrors/farc (date accessed: October 11, 2002).

⁴⁷ Lowi, Theodore J. *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority*. New York: Norton, 1969, p. 3.

⁴⁸ Communal violence between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives in the post-War era. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates in its *Annual Report 1996* that hundreds of thousands were killed or injured in 1996 in Burundi alone.

⁴⁹ Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, wars have been fought in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and the Kosovo region of Serbia.

⁵⁰ See Stern, Kenneth S. *A Force upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement and the Politics of Hate*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

⁵¹ Kelley, Donald R., and Bonnie G. Smith, eds. *Proudhon: What Is Property?* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 13.

⁵² Quoted in Ferracuti, Franco. "Ideology and Repentance: Terrorism in Italy." In Reich, Walter, ed. *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998, p. 60.

⁵³ For a good journalistic chronology of the Spanish Civil War, see Haigh, R. H., D. S. Morris, and A. R. Peters. *The Guardian Book of the Spanish Civil War*. Aldershot, Hants, UK: Wildwood House, 1987.

54 TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

⁵⁴ Janis, Mark W. *An Introduction to International Law*, 3d ed. New York: Aspen Law & Business, 1999, p. 171.

⁵⁵ Stern, Jessica. *The Ultimate Terrorists*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 18.

⁵⁶ See Hurwood, Bernhardt J. *Society and the Assassin: A Background Book on Political Murder*. New York: Parents' Magazine Press, 1970, p. 17 ff.

⁵⁷ Jaffar. Interview with Jamil Hamad. "First Person: I Shot an Israeli." *Time*, October 23, 2000.

⁵⁸ Sharon, Ariel. "Sharon Vows to Defeat 'War of Terrorism.'" *New York Times*, December 3, 2001.

⁵⁹ Tyson, Ann Scott. "Weighing War in Afghanistan on a Moral Scale." *Christian Science Monitor*, October 19, 2001.

⁶⁰ This table has been adapted from Sederberg, Peter C. *Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989, p. 34.

⁶¹ For a discussion of the ambiguities about defining combatants and noncombatants, see Sederberg (note 61 above), pp. 37-39.

⁶² For a discussion of the ambiguities about defining indiscriminate force, see Sederberg (note 61 above), pp. 39-40.